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 ABSTRACT 
There is a longstanding discussion of what the criteria are to distinguish science 
from non-science.  In section one of this paper, I will focus on four demarcating criteria 
of a scientific theory: (1) value neutrality; (2) verifiability; (3) falsifiability; and (4) 
reproducibility.  Keeping these criteria in mind, I will turn to the notion of moral agency 
(focusing on psychopathy, autism, and personal identity) and the question of whether 
the current way we conceptualize and research it can be deemed as scientific according 
to the four criteria. 
In section two, I will discuss the role psychopathy and autism play in 
understanding moral agency.   It is a popular view that the best way to find the 
underpinning of normally developed moral agency is to look to two groups diagnosed 
with deficiencies in rational and affective capacities; psychopathic and autistic 
individuals. Further, by looking at these three arguments, it is clear that most theorists 
misunderstand Hume’s theory in that they see it as strictly sentiment-driven when, in 
fact, he argued for a mixed account involving both rationality and sentiment.   
In section three, I will discuss personal identity and how it is intertwined with 
moral agency.  There are many theories of personal identity that attempt to answer the 
metaphysical questions about its nature.  This section will not focus on this aspect of 
personal identity, but rather on the idea that personality is externally shaped through 
judgements of moral behaviors.  I will argue that moral motivation is not only correlated
iii 
 
with personal identity, but also guides our intuitions and judgements of it.  There 
are a few theories I will focus on that, when looked at as pieces of a whole, seem to 
support the notion that personal identity, and our conceptualization of it, is rooted in our 
perception of morality. 
In the fourth and final section of this paper I discuss whether the conception of 
moral agency as studied through psychopathy, autism, and personal identity is scientific 
regarding the four criteria specified in section one.  After reflecting on each of the 
criteria, I conclude that moral agency can be considered scientific. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Criteria to demarcate science from non-science are essential not only to our 
improving our standard of life, but to the way in which we conduct ourselves on a 
moment-to-moment basis.  Whether we trust something to be a science or scientifically 
proven guides us in our various decision-making processes, from healthcare and expert 
testimony,1 to how we eat, dress, communicate, exercise, and travel.  
Demarcation criteria between science and non-science need to be applied to 
theories of moral agency due to those theories researching not only normally developed 
individuals, but also individuals diagnosed with physical and psychological disabilities 
and disorders.  It is crucial that the research being performed in the fields of 
neuroscience, psychology, sociology, etc., meet the requirements of being scientific to 
ensure not only that the methods are validated, but that the well-being of the 
participants is the top priority.   
  
                                            
1 “Science and Pseudo-Science,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (September 2008, 
revised April 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/. 
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I. CRITERIA FOR BEING A SCIENTIFIC THEORY 
 
The problem of demarcation raises the question of how to distinguish science 
from non-science.  While there is an ongoing debate of how best to demarcate the two, I 
will focus on four criteria: (1) value neutrality; (2) verifiability; (3) falsifiability; and (4) 
reproducibility.  
 
I.1 VALUE NEUTRALITY 
 
Amedeo Giorgi2 defines value neutrality as: “a way of trying to handle the 
problem of researcher bias based upon extra-scientific factors. But, if the values that 
one wants to advocate have a scientific basis, then one can argue for them based on 
the evidence. This position obviously assumes the priority of the scientific perspective”.3  
Giorgi argues that there is a distinction between neutrality and objectivity.  He uses 
Freund’s definition of “value orientation” to demonstrate this distinction. “…value 
orientation is the subjective factor which enables the scientist to acquire limited 
objective knowledge (of the world), always provided that he or she is conscious of this 
limitation.”4  He furthers this notion by adding that rationality is required in this process 
                                            
2 Amedeo Giorgi, "Facts, Values and the Psychology of the Human Person" in Indo-Pacific 
Journal of Phenomenology 6, special ed. (August 2006): 1-17, doi:10.1080/20797222.2006.11433931. 
3 Ibid., 4. 
4 Ibid. 
 
 
3 
and that personal experience (i.e., personal subjectivity) and “vague emotionality” 
should be excluded.5  The importance of value neutrality in a scientific theory is 
highlighted by the notions of underdetermination and theory-ladeness. 
Underdetermination is the idea that “theory is […] underdetermined by data in 
that for any body of observational data, […] more than one theory can be constructed to  
systemize, predict, and explain that data, so that no one theory’s truth is determined by 
the data.”6  In other words, for any set of data, two or more competing theories can be 
supported by the evidence.  If this is the case, then it seems that instead of arriving at 
truth, we are observing data in light of the theory we are presupposing (i.e., our 
observations and interpretations are theory-laden) and not engaging in Thomas Kuhn’s 
ideal of “theory choice”.7   
Theory choice is determining which theory is better supported by the evidence 
using the criteria of: (1) accuracy; (2) consistency; (3) scope; (4) simplicity; and (5) 
fruitfulness.8  If theory choice is not a rational process that we can engage in, then it 
appears value neutrality is not attainable.  However, turning back to Giorgi and his 
distinction between neutrality and objectivity, Giorgi argues not that the object of 
science9 should be studied in a non-reductionist manner, but rather that they be studied 
without the personal values (i.e., beliefs) of the scientists influencing the data.10 While 
                                            
5 Ibid.  
6 Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2006), 201. 
7 Thomas Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice,” in Philosophy of Science: 
Contemporary Readings, eds. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, (London: Routledge, 2007), 421-437. 
8 Ibid., 421. 
9 It should be noted that Giorgi is making this argument specifically regarding psychology as an 
epistemological (i.e., pertaining to the methods, validity and scope of the field), not a normative/ethical, 
science (pg. 1, 8).  
10 Giorgi, 1. 
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some hold that, due to theory-ladeness, theory choice is not an objective process, if we 
accept that there is a clear delineation between neutrality and objectivity, and that a 
theory need only be value-neutral and not value-objective or value-free, then the 
criterion of value neutrality is still viable. 
 
I.2 VERIFIABILITY 
 
Rosenberg defines verification as establishing the truth of a claim through 
observation.11  Following from this, a criterion that demarcates science from non-
science is whether the theory is verified by evidence.  Logical Positivists, according to 
Rosenberg,12 deemed supportability by meaningful data was the demarcation between 
science and non-science.  To make this distinction, Logical Positivists posited that 
objective, empirical observations must be made.13  Rosenberg argues that such a 
requirement leads to problems.  For example, he points out that no propositions, aside 
from ones describing instantaneous sensations, can be completely verified through 
testability.14  Because of this, complete verification was abandoned and, for Logical 
Positivists, indirect confirmability was taken up.  Alternatively, as that still posed issues, 
the notion of falsification proved more efficient. 
 
                                            
11 Rosenberg, 201. 
12 Alex Rosenberg, “Biology and Its Philosophy,” in Philosophy of Science: Contemporary 
Readings, eds. Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, (London: Routledge, 2007), 22-34. 
13 Ibid., 25.  
14 Ibid. 
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I.3 FALSIFIABILITY 
 
According to Karl Popper,15 “what makes a conjecture a scientific one is that it is 
open to be tested and perhaps refuted.”16  The methodology of demarcation is, 
according to Popper, to “propose theories which can be criticized.  Think about possible 
falsifying experiments—crucial experiments.  But do not give up your theories too 
easily—not, at any rate, before you have critically examined your criticism”.17 
Rosenberg states that for a proposition to be labeled as scientific, it must only be 
logically possible to show that it is false.18  He defines falsification as “the demonstration 
that a statement is false by the discovery of a counterexample”,19 one counterexample 
being sufficient for falsification.  Science with its increasing approximation to the truth, 
he claims, is dependent on the falsification of not only tested hypotheses, but on 
scientists’ responses to them.20  However, he emphasizes that “strict” falsifiability of a 
general hypothesis is impossible as nothing follows from a general law.  One of the 
examples Rosenberg uses to illustrate this point is “all swans are white”.  From this 
hypothesis, it does not follow that (1) there are such things as swans, (2) if there were 
such things as swans then all of them are white, or (3) we would be able to identify the 
swans as being white through observation.  These claims, Rosenberg states, are 
referred to as “auxiliary assumptions”.21  The problem that general hypotheses (e.g., all 
                                            
15 Karl Popper, “The Problem of Demarcation,” in Philosophy: Basic Readings, ed. Nigel 
Warburton, (London: Routledge, 2005), 247-257. 
16 Ibid., 247. 
17Ibid., 253. 
18 Rosenberg (2007), 28. 
19 Rosenberg (2006), 196. 
20 Rosenberg (2006), 117. 
21 Ibid. 
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swans are white) raise is that we cannot determine through falsifying tests if it is the 
hypothesis itself that is false rather than one of the auxiliary assumptions.  Popper 
expounds upon auxiliary hypotheses and ad hoc hypotheses as immunizing strategies: 
Ad hoc hypotheses—that is, at the time untestable auxiliary hypotheses—can 
save almost any theory from any particular refutation. [However,] it may become 
testable; and a negative test may force us either to give it up or to introduce a 
new secondary ad hoc hypothesis, and so on, ad infinitum. This, in fact, is a thing 
we almost always avoid. (I say ‘almost’ because methodological rules are not 
hard and fast.) Moreover, the possibility of making things up with ad hoc 
hypotheses must not be exaggerated: there are many refutations which cannot 
be evaded in this way, even though some kind of immunizing tactic such as 
ignoring the refutation is always possible.22 
 
With this, Popper clarifies that when a theory contains auxiliary hypotheses, we cannot 
falsify the theory because we are not able to determine whether it is the theory or the 
assumptions we are making that are avoiding refutations.  In other words, we are not 
able to test and observe the assumptions we are making.  Popper contends that the 
value of the falsifiability criterion is that it highlights the differences between theories 
that are laden with immunizing strategies, such that everything is compatible with them 
(i.e., non-scientific theories), and theories that are highly falsifiable, such that “they 
exclude an infinity of conceivable possibilities”.23  
  
                                            
22 Popper, 255. 
23 Ibid., 255.  
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I.4 REPRODUCIBILITY 
 
Reproducibility/replicability can be understood as the universality of empirical 
tests, as stated by Dan Gezelter.24  Gezelter explains that a theory is not scientific by 
the standards of the reproducibility criterion unless it is reproducible not only in principle, 
but also in practice.25  Thus, the tests should be replicable by any scientist, under 
similar conditions, and result in similar findings; the degree of similarity in the findings 
will be dependent on how successfully the scientist can replicate the independent 
variables.26  This is vital to demarcating science from non-science in that without 
validating the measures and accounting for confounding variables, the tests cannot be 
regarded as reliable, and therefore do not aid us in accurately researching the topic of 
interest. 
According to Sabina Leonelli, there is a reproducibility crisis that has brought 
attention to the epistemic significance of reproducibility.  Numerous studies are failing to 
reproduce “well-established, published research…”27  One reason for this, as she points 
out, might be that due to increasing social and environmental pressures, scientists are 
becoming sloppier in their eagerness to produce publications.  Other possible reasons 
for this “crisis of reproducibility” are: lack of effective quality control within journals, 
                                            
24 Dan Gezelter, “Being Scientific: Falsifiability, Verifiability, Empirical Tests, and Reproducibility,” 
The OpenScience Project. (December 1, 2009), http://openscience.org/being-scientific-fasifiability-
verifiability-empirical-tests-and-reproducibility/. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Sabina Leonelli, “Re-Thinking Reproducibility as a Criterion for Research Quality,” in Research 
in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology. (January 2018) http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/14352/1/Reproducibility_2018_SL.pdf. 
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which results in unreliable results; increase in the complexity and scale of 
measurements and lack of clarity of responsibilities in the publication process; cognitive 
biases and reinforcement of preexisting beliefs, and setting up research plans and 
validation procedures in accordance with the biases and beliefs; manipulation of data to 
fit desired outcome; and lack of transparency and effective criticisms around methods 
and data.28  “Direct reproducibility,” Leonelli asserts, “works best in research 
environments characterized by a high standardization of methods and materials, a high 
degree of control over environmental variability, and reliable and relevant methods of 
statistical inference.29  She states that it is important to acknowledge that across 
research fields, the circumstances of reproducibility will differ.  Thus, it is imperative to 
engage in discussions of how to improve research methods and acknowledge the 
strengths and weaknesses of approaches where reproducibility is impossible or 
irrelevant.  In doing so, we can learn different ways of validating results and where each 
field varies in investigating scientific inquiries.30 
Keeping these criteria in mind, I turn now to the notion of moral agency 
(specifically focusing on the roles psychopathy, autism, and personal identity play in our 
understanding of moral agency) and the question of whether the current way we are 
conceptualizing and researching it in these areas can be deemed as scientific according 
to the four criteria. 
                                            
28 Ibid., 3. 
29 Ibid., 14. 
30 Ibid., 16 
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II. PSYCHOPATHY, AUTISM, AND MORAL AGENCY 
 
The debate over what the driving force of moral agency is typically falls under 
one of two approaches, that of Kant or that of Hume.  Theorists of moral agency (e.g., 
clinical psychologists and moral philosophers) propose that Kant’s view holds rationality 
to be the core of moral agency, while Hume’s view holds sentiment/affect to be the core. 
Individuals diagnosed with psychopathy and autism have been at the center of the 
question of how moral agency develops due to their deficiencies in rationality and/or 
empathy.  By looking at these two groups, it is thought to be the case that we will gain 
insight as to what the core of moral agency is in normally developed individuals.  
Theorists seem to take one of two sides in their examination of moral agency in 
psychopaths and individuals with autism; Kant’s or Hume’s.  A Kantian account of moral 
agency makes rationality the motivating force of moral concern.  In contrast, the 
commonly misinterpreted Humean view makes sentiment and affect the driving forces 
of moral concern.   
In this section, I will first lay out the argument posed by Jeanette Kennett, who 
supports a Kantian view of moral agency.  Next, I will look at Victoria McGeer, who 
relies heavily on Kennett’s theory, but argues for a “broadly Humean” account of moral 
agency.  I claim that McGeer’s account of moal agency is a less “broad” account of 
Hume’s theory than she thinks.  Then, I will turn to Shaun Nichols, who also argues for 
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a “Humean view” by showing the lack of sufficient evidence for two rationalist views.  
I will conclude first by raising concern about the lack of differentiation between the 
concepts of “amoral” and “immoral” in psychopathy.  Then, I will argue that, of the three 
theorists surveyed, McGeer comes closest to presenting a full picture of moral agency 
insofar as she appeals to both sentiment and reason through her responses to Kennett. 
However, even McGeer incorrectly assumes that Hume’s account is only sentiment-
driven.  This is a misrepresentation of Hume due to his explicit statement that both 
sentiment and reason are required in moral deliberations and actions. 
 
II.1 KENNETT, “AUTISM, EMPATHY AND MORAL AGENCY”  
 
Kennett claims that while both psychopaths and those with autism lack empathy, 
it does not seem to be the case that autistic individuals are amoral, unlike psychopaths.  
What, then, accounts for the amorality of the psychopath (and not the autistic 
individual)? Kennett states that “an examination of moral thinking in high-functioning 
autistic people supports a Kantian rather than Humean account of moral agency,” 
suggesting that moral agency is a matter of rational capacity in psychopaths.31  Kennett 
first looks at how empathy is characterized in the psychological and philosophical 
literature, and then turns to the question of how crucial empathy is to moral 
understanding and agency. 
Psychopathic behavior is described as “impulsivity and irresponsibility; they 
[psychopaths] are habitual liars, are indifferent to the rights of others, and display lack of 
                                            
31 Jeanette Kennett, "Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency," The Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 
208 (2002): 340-57. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00272. 
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remorse for wrongdoing.  When they do something wrong, they do not really see what 
the fuss is about, and may engage in rationalizations and blame-shifting.”32  These 
behaviors seem to point to a lack of empathy, a deficit in affective capacity.  Those 
diagnosed as psychopaths are unable to understand the emotions and concerns of 
others, which is central to moral understanding according to many theorists.  Kennett 
points out Hume’s mirroring process, which is the ability to see another person’s 
emotions and be susceptible to them, mirroring them and forming an idea about them.  
In essence, it is having the ability to sympathize with others.  Kennett also notes that 
there is empirical evidence for sympathetic tendencies in developmental psychology 
and neuroscience, and she claims that this evidence offers support for the Humean 
account of sympathy.  Psychopaths, however, lack this ability to simulate emotions – an 
ability which seems to be a vital part of moral concern.  Kennett argues that without this 
ability, we fail to become moral agents.  This seems to be true of psychopaths, but not 
individuals with autism.  Lack of empathy cannot be the only constituent for the 
psychopath’s “moral failings” due to the capacity of autistic individuals for “clumsy” 
moral agency despite their lack of empathy.33   
Kennett refers to the psychiatric literature for a better understanding of autistic 
behavior in order to find the moral underpinnings of it (or lack thereof).  Specifically, on 
page 346, she cites the DSM3 which lists the following impairments in individuals with 
autism.  She believes these impairments to be relevant to Hume’s theory of moral 
sentiment and moral motivation:  
                                            
32 Ibid., 341. 
33 Ibid., 345. 
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(i) Specific abnormalities of social behaviour, affecting in particular, reciprocal 
relating and empathy. 
(ii) Communication difficulties affecting non-verbal communicatory conversational 
skills (pragmatics) and prosody. 
(iii) Lack of creativity and imagination, as evident in, for example, a paucity of 
pretend-play and an inability to role-play, this lack of creativity being 
accompanied by a characteristic rigidity and repetitiveness of behavior. 
Due to these impairments, individuals with autism are unable to read social cues and 
have virtually no social perception.  This tendency contrasts with psychopaths who are 
often regarded as having ‘mindreading abilities.’  They can predict behavior and are 
rather socially competent, but autistic individuals are the ones that seem to show moral 
concerns, though these concerns cannot be grounded in empathy based on the 
description provided.  So, what motivates their moral concerns?  Kennett’s answer is 
reason.  According to testimonies from various high-functioning autistic adults, they 
develop moral rules and principles through reasoning derived from experience and 
enquiry.  Jim Sinclair provides an account of an interaction with a grief-stricken person.  
He reasoned that the appropriate action to take was to console the person through 
touch.  “Sinclair has, it seems, a generalized moral concern, what we might call a sense 
of duty, or a conscience. His moral feelings are of a Kantian, rather than a Humean, 
cast.”34  Kennett finds this to support Kant’s idea that moral feeling does not stem from 
an emotional connection, but from practicality and a sense of duty to do the right thing. 
                                            
34 Ibid., 352. 
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Kennett notes that both Kant and Hume agree that the motivation to act morally 
comes from feeling.  However, Kant believes this feeling arises from reason.  The 
difference between autistic individuals and psychopaths is in the psychopaths’ disregard 
for others.  While this may seem to be a problem of affective capacity, Kennett argues 
that the inability to consider others arises from the inability to find reasons to do so.  
Autistic individuals are capable of recognizing differences in the behavior of themselves 
and of others, making sense of them, and acting accordingly to the situation.  Kennett 
argues that in this way, the Kantian account offers full moral agency to autistic 
individuals as conscientious agents.  She claims that “reverence for reason is the core 
moral motive, the motive of duty.”35  Psychopaths do not engage with the environment 
in this way.  They do not feel the need or desire to, so they do not develop a deep 
sense of self.  Their undeveloped sense of self, Kennett argues, is the downfall of their 
ability to be moral agents.36  From this, she concludes that a Kantian account of moral 
agency is right and that only conscientious individuals guided and motivated by reason 
are capable of being moral agents. 
II.2 McGeer, “Varieties of Moral Agency: Lessons from Autism (and 
Psychopathy)” 
 
Victoria McGeer37 responds to Kennett’s conclusion that “reverence for reason is 
the core moral motive” and claims that this debate has been too narrowly focused on 
empathy.  She posits that we need not try to reduce morality to one cognitive capacity 
                                            
35 Ibid., 355. 
36 Ibid., 356. 
37 Victoria McGeer, “Varieties of Moral Agency: Lessons from Autism (and Psychopathy),” 
in Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and 
Development, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 227-257. 
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or affective disposition.  McGeer focuses on the question of whether our moral 
capacities are rooted in sentiment or in rationality.  Do our affective states guide us, or 
does reason channel our affective states?  McGeer, like Kennett, looks to the 
abnormalities in cognitive and affective capacities in those with autism and psychopathy 
for insight on what constitutes moral agency.38   
McGeer claims that “moral nature is shaped by (at least) three different 
tributaries of affectively laden concern”: 
(i) Concern or compassion for others, growing out of the attachment 
system and fostered mainly by a capacity for emotional attunement 
between self and other, although later also supported by perspective-
taking skills. 
(ii) Concern with social position and social structure, growing out of the 
need to operate within a hierarchically organized communal world and 
fostered by our highly-developed perspective-taking skill. 
(iii) Concern with "cosmic" structure and position, growing out of the need 
to view ourselves in intertemporal terms. 39 
The moral motivation of normally developed individuals falls mostly under the first 
sphere, but they can certainly act out of a combination and reflection of all three types of 
concern.  Psychopathic behavior stems from the second sphere (concern for social 
position), and autistic behavior from the third sphere (concern for order and structure).  
These concerns, McGeer argues, produce systems of value that shape our moral being.  
                                            
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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These concerns can also be influenced by affective and cognitive impairments that are 
seen in individuals with both psychopathy and autism.   
 A lack of empathy is both an emotional/affective and a cognitive deficit.  It is 
emotional in that it deprives one of the ability to empathize and affectively shift 
perspective.  It is cognitive in that it prohibits one from seeing why other people’s 
concerns should matter.  While psychopaths are able to shift perspective, and recognize 
motives in others’ actions, they are not able to understand why others’ motives and 
emotions should matter to them.  They are not affected by other people’s suffering and 
condemnation.40  McGeer asserts that this lack of affective responsiveness is an 
impairment to their moral capacity and that they cannot distinguish between moral and 
conventional transgressions.  Individuals with autism, however, are deeply motivated to 
do what they preconceive as the right thing based both on observation of others’ 
behaviors and emotions and on their learning history in responding to others’ behaviors 
and emotions. 
Autistic individuals show a deep need for order.  McGeer argues that this passion 
for reason and order is affective in nature, supporting a Humean account of moral 
agency.  From Kennett’s argument, it follows that reason is sufficient for moral agency 
when affective capacity is not developed.  McGeer, however, points out that we do not 
know the extent to which autistic individuals are driven by moral concern.  Though they 
do, in fact, act on a need for order and reason, we do not know whether such behavior 
is morally driven or if they are able to determine that at all.  It appears they have a naïve 
moral sensibility, but as of now we cannot assert whether they would eventually become 
                                            
40 Ibid., 230. 
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autonomous moral agents.41  McGeer agrees with Kennett that many high-functioning 
autistic individuals do become autonomous moral agents in that they are “able and 
willing to govern their own behavior and to judge the behavior of others by reference to 
a deeper, more reflective consideration of the ends such behavior might be thought to 
serve”.42   
However, I am not sure whether we can assert that this is an autonomous moral 
agency, or if this is just a very complex system of rule-following which seems to be a 
very taxing process.  McGeer highlights the case of Temple Grandin in this issue.  
Grandin, an autistic individual, used Star Trek to develop rules to assist him in 
navigating the social world.  He referred to this process as “strictly logical”.43  The 
question remains if reverence for reason is the moral motivation for individuals with 
autism, or if, as McGeer suggests, this is a passion for reason which is based in affect.44  
McGeer argues that due to this passion, autistic individuals follow rules as a mean of 
maintaining order in and of itself, allowing them to develop moral agency.  Further, 
McGeer disagrees with Kennett that we must find a common feature in the affective 
profiles between individuals with autism and normally developed individuals.  We should 
not expect to find such a common feature due to their reasons for affective behavior 
being different (i.e., the need for order for people with autism).45  In this way, individuals 
with autism act in accordance with the third sphere of concern, the need for structure.  
                                            
41 Ibid., 237.  
42 Ibid., 242. 
43 Ibid., 232.  
44 Ibid., 244. 
45 Ibid., 247. 
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Psychopaths, too, act in accordance with one of the three spheres of concern, 
although the sphere is distorted.  They are not concerned with the emotions of others, 
nor with the “cosmic” structure, but rather with their own standing in society.  Kennett 
speculates that while this concern does not operate in the same way that it does in 
normal moral agency, it allows them to “mind read” and manipulate others.  Therefore, 
psychopaths are better at “passing for normal” than those with autism.  McGeer asserts 
that, due to this resemblance in affective capacity through the spheres of concern, 
moral agency is rooted in affect.  Though the differences in affective profiles are vast, 
she holds in a “broadly Humean way” that affect is the essence of morality, though 
reason is a prerequisite.  
 
II.3 NICHOLS, “HOW PSYCHOPATHS THREATEN MORAL RATIONALISM” 
 
In Shaun Nichols’ paper, “How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: Is it 
Irrational to be Amoral?” he attacks two views, which he refers to as Conceptual 
Rationalism and Empirical Rationalism.46  He argues that while a Kantian approach to 
moral agency is appealing, due to threats posed by psychopaths, it is implausible as an 
account of what constitutes moral agency.   
The Conceptual Rationalist claim, as stated by Nichols, is that morality is 
conceptualized as though moral requirements are requirements of reason.47  The 
problem psychopaths pose to this claim, Nichols asserts, is that they can judge an 
                                            
46 Shaun Nichols, “How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: Is it Irrational to be Amoral?” in 
Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Nadelhoffer et al. (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010), 73-83. 
47 Ibid., 73.  
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action as something that is morally required, but they do not feel motivated to take that 
action.  Nichols links this to Hume’s “sensible knave” and Brink’s argument that one 
may be capable of moral judgments while being a rational amoralist.48  I will expound 
upon my problem with this statement in the section summary.  The idea, however, is 
that psychopaths do not fit our concept of morality because they do not make moral 
judgements, they merely make ‘moral’ judgements – the difference being that their 
motivation is not to act morally.49    What Nichols suggests is that these claims posed by 
Conceptual Rationalists are not claims about psychopaths, but rather are claims about 
our concept of morality in relation to psychopaths.50 
The Empirical Rationalist claim is that moral judgements stem from our rational 
capacities, not our affective capacities nor our concept of morality.51  What Nichols 
argues here is that psychopaths do not pose a problem for the claim that rational 
capacities are the basis for morality, but that the psychopath’s deficiency in moral 
judgement can be explained by a deficiency in affective response.52  To further the 
objection against the Empirical Rationalist, the claim that the moral deficit lies in the 
inability to shift perspective does not stand.  This is due to evidence suggesting that 
psychopaths are able not only to understand the motives of others, but to use their 
understanding to manipulate others (e.g., what the previous sources refer to as “mind 
reading”).  Also, individuals with autism have been shown to lack this ability, yet we do 
not attribute to them a lack of moral judgement.   
                                            
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 75. 
50 Ibid., 76. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, 79. 
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The solution to understanding the differences between psychopaths, autistic 
individuals, and normally developed individuals, Nichols asserts, lies in finding a deficit 
present in psychopaths and not autistic individuals.53  Due to the non-rationalist 
explanation of the lack of responsiveness in psychopaths to the harm done to others, 
the evidence points towards a Humean account.  Thus, Nichols concludes that the 
moral deficiency in psychopaths is to be found in affective capacities.54 
 
II.4 SECTION SUMMARY 
 
One problem with these arguments provided by Kennett, McGeer, and Nichols 
that none explicitly address is that of the reason that psychopaths are deemed amoral 
rather than immoral.  The term “rational amoralist” is used by Nichols, but he does not 
differentiate between amorality and immorality.  Amorality is conceptualized as the 
inability to differentiate between right and wrong, whereas immorality is conceptualized 
as knowing what is right versus wrong, but not being motivated to act accordingly.  
Psychopaths, as described in each of the sources, seem to fit the idea of being immoral 
rather than amoral in this way.  They can understand the motivations and emotions of 
others, but they do not care to engage with others in a way that is motivated by their 
well-being.  The views posed by these authors fail to address this matter, thus leaving 
an opportunity for an otherwise unnecessary criticism. 
                                            
53 Ibid., 78. 
54 Ibid., 82. 
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Another shortcoming of Kennett, McGeer, and Nichols is that they attempt to 
offer a reductive argument for moral agency.  This is surprising of McGeer in that she 
explicitly states that we need not reduce morality to one cognitive capacity or affective 
disposition, as we do when we so narrowly focus on empathy as the source component.  
Yet, she still settles on a deficiency in affect as the contributing source of amoralism.  
She does so by arguing that rationality is rooted in affective capacity (i.e., the passion 
for reason and order in autistic individuals).   Psychopaths, she asserts, are lacking in 
affective responsiveness in that they are not able to empathize with others, accounting 
for why we label them as amoral but not those diagnosed with autism.  While McGeer 
claims that her view is a “broadly Humean” account of moral agency, I believe that due 
to her careful considerations and modifications of Kennett’s assertions, she is 
unknowingly advocating for a less “broad” and more precise depiction of the Humean 
account (although she still fails to recognize this).  Kennett finds rationality to be the 
essence of moral agency, as we see through her claim that, while empathy is an 
affective capacity, the lack of empathy lies in the inability to rationalize why it is 
important to empathize with others.  Nichols also points to the psychopath’s lack of 
affective responsiveness as evidence against a Kantian/rationalist view of moral 
agency.  He argues that while there are both rational and affective deficits in 
psychopaths and autistic individuals, the affective deficits offer non-rationalist 
explanations for amoralism.  Why not acknowledge that both rationality and sentiment 
are constituents of moral agency, rather than attempt to reduce one to the other?   
With these views and question in mind, I argue that the mentioned theorists work 
with a misrepresentation of the Humean account by failing to understand it as a mixed 
 
 
21 
theory of moral agency.  Hume’s view is not strictly grounded in sentiment as they seem 
to suggest.  In fact, he argues that a purely rational or purely sentiment-based 
hypothesis alone cannot account for what constitutes moral agency.  Hume states that, 
“reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusion […] 
There are just grounds to conclude […] that moral beauty partakes much of this latter 
species, and demands the assistance of our intelligent faculties”.55  These debates offer 
evidence in support of Hume’s theory that both features are required of moral agency.  
The differences in individuals that are autistic, psychopathic, and normally developed 
show that a one-sided view cannot account for the entirety of moral agency across all 
human beings due to the array of motivations in the behavior of affective and rational 
profiles.
                                            
55 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited, and with an 
Introduction, by J. B. Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1983); 15. 
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III. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND MORAL AGENCY 
 
Personal identity is largely thought to be a construct.  However, this does not mean 
that no aspects of personal identity have been empirically validated, but only that further 
validation is needed.  While some components of personal identity can be shown to 
have generating mechanisms in the brain, personal identity seems to also be an 
externally validated social construct.  That is, it not only relies on one’s self-conception, 
but on the assessments and perspectives of others.  I argue that the construction of 
personal identity is a socially interactive process in which others act as a reflection of an 
individual’s perceived moral motivation.  By using others’ perceived image of ourselves, 
we can adjust and move towards an intended self.  This section will focus on a few 
theories that support a larger picture of personal identity: a neurobiological account, 
which suggests that social engagement helps to shape and construct personal identity, 
and a direction of change/multiple identity view that also supports the requirement of 
external validation for personal identity. 
I will first define the terms “self”, “personhood”, “personality”, and “personal 
identity” to distinguish them as distinct, but dependent on one another.  Then, I will 
present empirical evidence suggesting the interdependency of the brain and personal 
identity.  Then, I will rely on a study of expatriates’ experience in ethically challenging 
situations to support my assertion that social engagement helps to shape and construct 
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personal identity and personality.  Next, I will argue that, within personal identity, 
there are multiple identities that we attribute to an individual, and that we rely on the 
direction of change a personality takes to guide our intuitions and judgements.  This 
supports the idea that personal identity is externally validated.  Lastly, I will argue that 
these considerations point towards an understanding of personal identity as correlated 
to and rooted in moral agency and motivation. 
 
III.1 DEFINING THE TERMS 
 
Rabins and Blass56 define these key terms as follows: 
Personhood refers to the notion that an individual’s (person’s) life has a 
value because it is a living being.  
Self refers to the experience of the individual. 
Personal identity includes not only one’s self-conception, but also the 
views/observations of others. 
Traits are specific descriptive characteristics that can be observed in all 
human beings.  They are universal and individuals differ in the 
amount of any given trait. 
Personality is the constellation of these traits that is unique for each 
individual.  It is relatively stable throughout one’s life and can 
                                            
56 Peter V. Rabins & David M. Blass, “Toward a Neurobiology of Personal Identity,” in Personal 
Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives from Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience, eds. Debra J. H. 
Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 39-49. 
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predict patterns of future behavior. Personality is both heritable and 
environmentally shaped.  It “identifies an aspect of personal identity 
that is observed in others and can be permanently altered by 
injuries or degenerative diseases of the frontal lobes of the brain”.57 
Similarly, Guimaraes-Costa and Pina e Cunha define identity as a process enacted in 
social context, so that the individual is not solely responsible for identity construction.  
Others reflect an image of the individual to which the individual responds by acting in 
such a way as to align their intended identity and reflected image, thus resulting in a 
relatively stable identity.58  In this way, identity is thought to be grounded in [moral] 
motivation, which I will further expound upon in subsection four.   
 
III.2 The Neurobiological Account 
 
The neurobiological view of personal identity offers empirical evidence 
suggesting that personal identity is directly linked to regions and functions of the brain.  
The evidence comes from cases that show damage to a specific region or function and 
the effects of said damage.  Certain aspects of personal identity such as narration, 
rational agency, intentionality, personality, and self-perception have been shown to be 
localized as types of generating mechanisms in regions/functions of the brain.  
However, its proponents acknowledge that the neurobiological view is not satisfactory 
                                            
57 Ibid., 43. 
58 Nuno Guimarães-Costa, Miguel Pina e Cunha, & Arménio Rego, "Building Yourself: A 
Sensemaking Approach to Expatriates’ Adjustment to Ethical Challenges," in Journal of Global Mobility: 
The Home of Expatriate Management Research, Vol. 2, Issue 1, (2014): 53-84. doi.org/10.1108/JGM-04-
2013-0020. 
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for all of the components of our concept of personal identity, such as the idea that there 
are different kinds of identity (logical, numerical, practical, moral, legal, etc.).  They also 
acknowledge that it does not offer a complete construct of all aspects of personal 
identity, e.g., the phenomenological aspects.   
Evidence suggests that aspects of personal identity can be localized, but that 
personal identity requires the “interaction among a distributed set of brain locations and 
systems”.59  Cases of brain injuries and disorders show that understanding the proper 
functioning of certain regions of the brain is necessary for explaining aspects of 
personal identity such as: (1) self-perception; (2) sensory data processing; (3) changes 
in personality due to injury, disorders, and the environment; (4) memory; and (5) 
narration.  These features also align with the notion that personal identity requires 
external validation. 
The left hemisphere has been found to be linked to the narrative element of 
personal identity through activation during self-recognition.  It constructs a narrative by 
connecting facts, past events, and experiences together to create a “unique, 
comprehensive, and comprehensible narrative”,60 and it is organized to make sense of 
sensory input.  The ability to accurately connect memories into a meaningful and unique 
construct is thought to be necessary for personal identity according to multiple theories.  
This supports the idea that personal identity is not only internally validated, but also 
externally validated in that the memories must be accurately connected.  If our 
                                            
59 Rabins & Blass, 41. 
60 Ibid., 45. 
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memories are not true to our reality, then a region or function of our brain is not working 
properly. 
Rational agency has also been argued to be necessary for personal identity and 
has been found to be linked to the medial frontal lobe.  It is also thought to be an 
externally validated component of personal identity.  The proper functioning of the 
medial frontal lobe is necessary for the persistence of a unique personality.  Personality 
is thought to be a required element of personal identity and damage to the frontal lobes 
has been shown to lead to drastic change in personality.  Damage to the frontal lobes 
leads to the loss of inhibition and/or a more apathetic state.61  Due to evidence from 
cases of injury or degenerative diseases to this region of the brain, Rabins and Blass 
conclude that undamaged frontal lobes are a “necessary contributor to externally 
observed personal identity”.62 
Rabins and Blass assert that intentionality is required for personal identity.  
Intentionality is also generated by the frontal lobes.  Intentionality refers to the idea that 
personal identity comes from within.  It is sometimes referred to as self-reflection or the 
idea that one’s sensory experience is unique to one’s body.  It enables one to act 
voluntarily with the environment.63 
While the neurobiological view might not be a complete picture of personal 
identity, accepting it as part of a larger picture enables us to further analyze the 
implications cases of brain injury and degenerative disorders have regarding the role 
the brain plays in non-abnormal cases.  To have a better understanding of personal 
                                            
61 Ibid., 42. 
62 Ibid., 43.  
63 Ibid., 49. 
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identity and our intuitions of it, we need to account not only for the brain’s role, but also 
for the different types of identity we attribute to an individual such as logical, numerical, 
practical, moral, legal, and so on (especially after they have undergone damage to the 
brain), the interactive process between the individual and the [social] environment, and 
moral motivation’s role.     
 
III.3 THE CORRELATION BETWEEN SELF-CONCEPTION AND OTHERS’ 
PERCEPTION  
 
Guimaraes-Costa and Pina e Cunha, in their article “A Sensemaking Approach to 
Expatriates’ Adjustment to Ethical Challenges,” assert that expatriates undergo a 
sensemaking process when they are faced with ethical challenges posed by the culture 
to which they are trying to adjust.64  From this research, they also posit that attitudes 
and personalities are justified by ascription of meaning and legitimized by intended 
future identity.  
On their account, personal identity – similarly to the neurobiological view – is 
dependent upon others’ perception and attribution of personality, as well as on the 
individuals’ self-conception, alignment of their image, and intended future identity. It is a 
“process that is being continuously enacted in a social context.”65  Intended identity, 
according to Guimarães-Costa et al., relies on context and identity construction, each of 
which consist of assumptions; their research shows evidence of the existence of these 
assumptions.  Context is determined by the following: (1) previous expectations, which 
                                            
64 Guimarães-Costa et al. 
65 Ibid., 107. 
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shape current actions, (2) intentions, which are reflected in actions, (3) actions, which 
are based on perceptions, and (4) social position and power, which influence the 
intentions of actions.66  Identity construction is determined by the following: (1) personal 
history that is a source of identity formation, (2) personal history that shapes intentions 
of action, (3) self-image which concurs to define action, (4) the future self, which 
concurs to define intentions of action, and (5) other individuals, who project an image 
that is reflected back.67  As described,  personal identity is constructed through social 
interaction and intentionality.   
The expatriates’ adjustment to their new culture is a sensemaking process that 
happens “when the current state of the world is perceived to be different from the 
expected state of the world, or when there is no obvious way to engage the world”.68  
The expatriates use past events and compare them with the present situation to give it 
meaning and decide their course of action.  This process has similarities to the narrative 
view of personal identity and is rooted in social interaction.  The neurobiological theory 
also describes this process and finds that the narrative center of the brain is in the left 
hemisphere.69 
Identity construction through social interaction is the basis of this sensemaking 
process. When facing an ethical challenge in a foreign social context the expatriates try 
to understand it and ascribe meaning to it through retrospection.  “The meaning 
ascribed to the situation (plausible story), which originates a response (action), depends 
                                            
66 Ibid., 148. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 106. 
69 Rabins and Blass, 45. 
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on their past experiences (identity), of the current unfolding events (on-going) and the 
way they interact with them (enactment), as well as on their future intentions (identity 
enhancement) as expatriates and individuals”.70  This process shows that when 
constructing personal identity, we rely not only on our self-conception, but on the 
perceived image others have of us, and we try to plan our course of action in order to 
take on that image or to alter it.  The neurobiological view also supports this process 
with its findings of narration in the left hemisphere, rational agency in the frontal lobe, 
and intentionality in the frontal lobe.  Both the intended future-self view and the 
neurobiological view assert that there is a “persisting, externally measurable contributor 
to personal identity”71 and that the validation of personality [and moral motivation] is 
thus necessary to its shape and construction.  To further the idea of external validation 
which relies on personality and moral motivation, let us turn to the notion of attribution of 
multiple identities, which is distinct from dissociative identity disorder. 
 
III.4 THE NOTION OF NUMEROUS IDENTITIES  
 
In “Personal Identity and the Phineas Gage Effect,” Kevin Tobia argues that it is 
possible, and (empirical evidence shows) intuitive, that it is not simply the magnitude of 
dissimilarity between a person at Time-1 and Time-2 that affects judgements of 
personal identity, but also whether the person’s personality has “improved” or 
“deteriorated”.72   
                                            
70 Costa et al., 107. 
71 Rabins & Blass, 49. 
72 Kevin P. Tobia, “Personal Identity and the Phineas Gage Effect,” in Analysis, Volume 75, Issue 
3 (1 July 2015): 396–405. doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv041. 
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Tobia conducted several experiments to test the hypothesis that the magnitude 
of dissimilarity is not the main deciding factor in the identity relation.  He found that 
“deteriorations” are considered to be “identity-severing” whereas “improvements” 
generally are not.  In other words, when someone’s personality and moral agency 
deteriorates, the person is considered to be “not the same person” anymore, whereas 
when they seem to have an improved personality, moral character, set of behaviors, 
etc., they are still considered to be “the same person” – just an improved version of 
themselves.  Thus, it is not the magnitude of dissimilarity that we use to make 
judgements about someone’s personal identity, but rather the direction of change in 
his/her personal identity after having undergone damage to their brain.73  Direction of 
change affects our intuitions because we use it to determine the personal identity 
relation between Time-1 and Time-2.  
  It might also be the case, he asserts, that the person is numerically non-
identical, but identical in other ways, if we accept that there are various types of identity 
such as numerical, practical, narrative, legal, and moral.  Under this assumption, some 
identities could be affected by the direction of change while other identities are not.  For 
example, in the case of Phineas Gage, who underwent massive damage to his frontal 
lobe and whose friends and family said he “was not the same person,” the deteriorated 
Phineas could be numerically non-identical to the pre-accident Phineas, while they are 
legally identical (for tax and property purposes).74  Further, in a thought experiment of a 
Russian nobleman asking his wife to follow certain moral responsibilities and honor his 
                                            
73 Ibid., 10. 
74 Ibid., 12. 
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current wishes, not his future ones, it seems that moral and legal properties are voided.  
So, if we hold that certain legal and moral properties do not depend on the direction of 
change but that numerical identity does, it seems that numerical identity is separate 
from legal identity and moral identity.  Thus, personal identity consists of multiple 
identities that rely on external judgement and validation. 
If direction of change is relevant to personal identity as Tobia suggests, then 
other normative ideas of identity will have consequences for moral and legal 
responsibilities.  The suggestion and intuition that normative notions are correlated to 
personal identity further supports the requirement of external validation and influence on 
the construction of personal identity – an identity that is rooted in moral behaviors and 
personality. 
 
III.5 TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: PERSONAL IDENTITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 
 
Our intuitions of personal identity stem from whether the person in question is 
behaving in accordance with others’ perception of the individual’s personality and 
previous behaviors. In most cases, this perception focuses on the individual’s 
moral/ethical behaviors.  Tobia suggests that it is not only the magnitude of dissimilarity 
between a person at Time-1 and at Time-2, but also the direction of change their 
personality went (i.e., whether the individual’s personality seemed to improve or 
worsen).  
An example Tobia uses is an episode of Star Trek when Captain Kirk gets split 
between his “positive side” and his “negative/evil” side.  The crew referred to his “good” 
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side as “Captain Kirk” and his “evil” side as “the imposter”.75  Tobia reviewed multiple 
scenarios in which the participants judged whether the character before and after brain 
injury, surgery, or old age was the “same person”.  His findings support the notion that if 
a person behaves in a morally better manner than they previously did, others still 
consider him to “be the same person”.  On the other hand, if he seems to be more 
callous, apathetic, or morally deficient, then others no longer consider the person in 
question to “be himself”.  In cases such as this, an individual might be considered 
legally identical (Tobia uses tax obligations in this sense) at Time-2 but non-identical in 
other ways such as numerically or morally.  In the case of Phineas Gage, we might also 
assert that he is numerically identical, but practically non-identical, at Time-2 to Gage at 
Time-1.   
This research suggests that we rely on several types of identities to form a 
conceptualization of personal identity and to guide our decisions about people who have 
undergone drastic change to their brain functioning and to the moral aspects of their 
personalities.  Further, and as a prerequisite, this implies that moral agency and 
personal identity are closely related due to personal identity consisting not only of an 
individual’s self-conception, but the image others form of that individual. Thus, a close 
review of the literature on personal identity points towards the view that it has 
generating mechanisms in the brain that interact between the individual and the 
environment.   These mechanisms form judgements of personality and moral motivation 
that reflect back to the individual, guiding his/her actions toward an intended identity.  
                                            
75 Ibid., 8. 
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As such, personal identity is a social construct in which others form judgements based 
on past and present moral behaviors and assessments of moral agency.   
A possible objection to a view such as this can be found in Eric Schwitzgebel’s 
article “Self-Ignorance.” 76  He asserts that, “Of general features of our stream of 
conscious experience, of our morally most important attitudes, of our real values and 
our moral character, of our intelligence, of what really makes us happy and unhappy, 
about such matters I doubt we have much knowledge at all.”77  The problem this view 
could pose is that if we are less knowledgeable than we think of our conscious 
experience, morals, values, etc., then how can we act with intentionality and form an 
intended future self in light of which we plan our course of action?  A possible response 
could be that even if we are less knowledgeable than some philosophers give us credit 
for, we have enough knowledge to form our self-conceptions and act with or against 
others’ perceptions of our moral behaviors towards an intended personal identity.  
Another possible response could be one on the side of behavior analysis.  Whether we 
act with intention, our [social] environment reinforces and punishes our behaviors to 
shape our personal identity.  This would support the idea that personal identity is 
externally shaped and validated, but a case would still need to be made for intentionality 
as a necessary component of personal identity.  
                                            
76 Eric Schwitzgebel, “Self-Ignorance,” in Consciousness and the Self, eds. JeeLoo Liu & 
John Perry (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-23. 
77 Ibid., 17. 
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IV. ARE MORAL AGENCY THEORIES SCIENTIFIC? 
 
After discussing four demarcating criteria of a scientific theory and ways in which 
moral agency is currently being conceptualized and researched, as pertaining to 
psychopathy, autism, and personal identity, we can now turn to the question of whether 
theories of moral agency are scientific.  
 
IV.1  CAN THEORIES OF MORAL AGENCY BE LABELED AS VALUE-NEUTRAL? 
 
As moral agency is researched predominantly within the field of psychology, I 
find this excerpt from Giorgi to be notable in the discussion of moral agency as value-
neutral. 
The position is upheld that psychology as a human science intentionally should 
not be absolutely value free in the sense that human reality has to be studied in a 
non-reductionistic manner and thus methods of study must be respectful of the 
full ethical sense of humanness. This is simply meeting the phenomenological 
requirement of “fidelity to the phenomenon”. However, psychology can be value 
free in the historical sense of the term properly understood because it refers to 
the fact that the personal values of the scientists ought not to be conflated with 
scientific findings.
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Giorgi’s assertion that the science of human psychology reflects our notions of value 
and our ethical deliberations aligns with the idea that a motivator to study psychology is 
to better understand our differences in thought, behavior, and values, and also 
concerning our constant aim for the validity and reliability of empirical data.  However, it 
seems as though he is using value free and value neutral synonymously.  I do not think 
that anyone would argue that science need be value-free, at least in the sense that the 
research inquiries scientists make are often ones they are passionate to investigate.  
Surely, no one is arguing that scientists must be free of values, ethics, and beliefs.  He 
refers to the fact that in the pursuit of truth through empirical observation, scientists 
should remain unbiased in their findings (and reports therein) and exclude any personal 
values or beliefs.  In other words, they should not presuppose personal beliefs or 
manipulate the data to make misconstrued and false claims.   
 As theories of moral agency rely on ethical considerations, I argue that while they 
may not be value-free or value-objective, it is possible for them to be value-neutral.  To 
claim this would not be adopting a universalist perspective of ethics.  Rather, it is 
claiming that the study and research of moral agency can be conducted in such a way 
that it is oriented to identify values in the studied individuals, and not make unfounded 
claims reflect the data. 
 
IV.2  ARE THEORIES OF MORAL AGENCY VERIFIABLE? 
   
I think one issue concerning verifiability is that the terms “verified” and “validated” 
are used synonymously.  Further, “validated” can be misleading if you do not know what 
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it refers to, which is the degree that a test, method, assessment, etc., measures what it 
is intended to.  It does not guarantee accuracy or mean that the test is the only way or 
best way to measure whatever it is measuring.  Rosenberg’s definition of verification as 
the Logical Positivists define it is establishing the truth of a claim through observation.78  
This is problematic because even a large number of observations cannot establish the 
truth of a claim because there are infinite variables and possibilities that we cannot 
observe.  Thus, I can use theories to predict outcomes with high degrees of certainty 
through empirical observation, but I cannot verify it as true given every circumstance, or 
even given one, through empirical observation.  Therefore, verification is not a strong 
criterion for demarcation between science and non-science.  Theories of moral agency, 
then, need not meet the criterion of verifiability in order to count as a scientific. 
 
IV.3  ARE THEORIES OF MORAL AGENCY “SCIENTIFIC” AS DEMARCATED BY 
FALSIFIABILITY? 
 
 Conjectures are scientific if they are open to be tested and perhaps refuted, 
according to Popper.79  They must be capable of conflicting with possible, or 
conceivable, observations.  Thus, a theory should not have explanatory power in which 
all observations are irrefutably compatible.  I do hold the research into moral agency 
through studies of its development in individuals diagnosed as psychopathic or autistic 
to be falsifiable, as well as the research regarding individuals who have suffered trauma 
resulting in changes to personal identity.  The most prominent theories look to 
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deficiencies in either rational and affective capacities or to trauma to specific areas of 
the brain to determine what the motivating factor of moral agency is in individuals 
without diagnosed disorders.  However, with further advancement of brain scanning 
technology, we could find that deficiencies in other capacities or activity/lack thereof in 
different areas of the brain are correlated with moral agency.   
 
IV.4  CAN THEORIES OF MORAL AGENCY BE REPRODUCED/REPLICATED? 
 
 Not just in theory, but also in practice?  Yes.  There are numerous validated 
assessments that measure rational and affective capacities, aspects of identity, 
judgements of morality, helping behaviors, empathetic and sympathetic capacities, 
functions and regions of the brain associated with personal identity and moral agency, 
etc.  This is not to say that all theories of moral agency meet the criterion of 
reproducibility.  The vast majority of personality tests, for example, are not empirically 
validated and do not reproduce similar results, even across multiple baselines of single 
case studies.  Further, it is not until after analyzing the data that researchers are aware 
of confounding variables.  Additionally, it might be the case that it is the assessments of 
certain psychological capacities that are reproducible and not the theory as a whole.  
This could play into Leonelli’s notion that conditions of reproducibility differ across fields 
of research. 
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IV.5  CONCLUSION 
 
Criteria to demarcate science from non-science guide us in our everyday lives by 
aiding us in decision-making processes about whether we trust various claims to be 
scientifically accurate.  As previously mentioned, demarcation criteria between science 
and non-science should be used in theories of moral agency due to those theories’ 
research involving individuals diagnosed with physical and psychological disabilities and 
disorders.  Not to say that only theories involving the testing and assessment of 
humans, or even more generally living creatures, are the only theories deemed worthy 
of holding the title “scientific”, but rather that this research meeting the requirements of 
what it is to be a scientific theory is the best way to ensure not only that the methods are 
validated, but that the well-being of the participants is the top priority.   
The ability to demarcate moral agency theories as scientific or not is essential so 
that those seeking psychological assistance and those providing it are knowledgeable of 
which methods and assessments have higher degrees of validity and reliability.  
Through the philosophical and psychological study of science and moral agency, it is 
clear that to have a comprehensive understanding of any particular theory, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that different fields not only inform one another, but are 
correlated. 
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